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D.C. Circuit: Nationwide Permits are “Final Action”
Natl. Assn. of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 417 F.3d 1272 (D.C. Cir 2005)
Jonathan Lew, 2L, Roger Williams University School of
Law
Introduction
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals recently found that
the issuance of nationwide permits by the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (Corps), pursuant to § 404(e) of
the Clean Water Act, constitutes a “final agency action”
under the Administrative Procedure Act that is subject
to judicial review. In addition, the court found that the
appellants1 may challenge the Corps’ compliance with
the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) but lack the requisite standing to challenge the agency’s action under the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).
Background
The Clean Water Act (CWA) grants the Corps the
power to issue permits for discharges of dredged or fill
material on a general or individual basis.2 If a proposed
activity is covered by a general permit, the party may
proceed with the activity without obtaining any further
permits because a general permit is issued class-wide
(state, regional, or national) and covers a category of
activities that are similar in nature. On the contrary, if
the proposed activity is not covered by a general permit,
the party must obtain an individual permit, which
requires a more comprehensive application process. The
individual permit process involves “site specific documentation and analysis, public interest review, public
notice and comment, and if necessary, a public hearing.”3 A party that does not meet the conditions for a
general permit or obtain an individual permit faces
both civil and criminal penalties.

The appellants challenged the Corps’ issuance of
several general permits called nationwide permits
(NWPs) claiming that the new NWPs were imposing
limits that exceeded the Corps’ statutory authority
under the CWA and violated both the RFA and
NEPA. Specifically, appellants challenged the “activityspecific” general permits that are replacing NWP 26
which, at one time, authorized a party to discharge
dredged or fill materials affecting up to ten acres without applying for an individual permit. The National
Association of Home Builders’ (NAHB’s) dissatisfaction stemmed from the Corps’ reduction of authorized
maximum per project acreage impact from ten acres to
one-half acre. In addition, the activity-specific general
permits require preconstrucion notification for
impacts greater than one-tenth acre.
See Final Action, page 8
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Miss. Court Requires Administrative
Exhaustion in Contamination Suit
Town of Bolton v. Chevron Oil Co., No. 2004-CA00865-COA (Miss. App. Aug. 2, 2005)
Gerald Woodward, 3L, Stetson University College of
Law
The Court of Appeals of Mississippi has ruled that the
appellants in a consolidated appeal of a circuit court
decision must exhaust their available administrative
remedies before they can pursue common law causes of
action for money damages against an oil company in
state court.
Background
Appeals arose from the dismissal of separate complaints
concurrently filed by the Town of Bolton, Mississippi
(Town) and two landowners, Mary George W.
McMullan and Hilda McRaney (landowners), against
Chevron Oil Company, Chevron Texaco Corporation
and J.R. Pounds, Inc. (Chevron). The complaints
alleged that Chevron had caused property leased from
the Town and landowners to become contaminated with
harmful and hazardous substances as a consequence of
its oil and/or natural gas exploration and production
activities thereon. The Town and landowners sought to
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recover money damages from Chevron under various
common law theories including tort, breach of contact,
and fraud. In the trial court Chevron’s motion for dismissal of the complaints was granted on the basis that
the plaintiffs had failed to first exhaust their administrative remedies through the Mississippi Oil and Gas Board
(Board). The Town and landowners separately appealed
the lower court ruling; the appellate court consolidated
these individual appeals into a single action.
The Appeal
On appeal the plaintiffs argued that since they had plead
common law theories of recovery, and the Board had no
jurisdiction or competence to adjudicate disputes rooted in common law or authority to award the types of
damages sought, an adequate remedy was not available
through the administrative process. Enforcement of a
requirement for exhaustion would thus be futile and
would cause them irreparable harm, as it would foreclose their right to recover monetary damages under
their common law causes of action. Additionally, the
dispositive questions were of law and therefore did not
depend upon the expertise of the Board to resolve. The
plaintiffs further moved that if the court found against
them on the question of exhaustion, then their common
law causes of action should be stayed pending exhaustion of their pursuit of administrative remedies through
actions of the Board.
The Court’s Analysis
Generally, Mississippi requires the exhaustion of administrative remedies before a plaintiff is permitted to pursue resolution of a dispute in state court.1 However,
when no adequate administrative remedy is available,
the requirement for exhaustion does not apply. 2
Mississippi case law has set out a number of factors to be
considered in determining whether exhaustion should
be required: whether the pursuit of the administrative
remedy would result in irreparable harm; whether the
agency clearly lacks jurisdiction; whether the agency’s
position is clearly illegal; whether the dispositive question is one of law; whether exhaustion would be futile;
and whether, comparatively, the action could be disposed of with less expense and more efficiently in the
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judicial arena.3 In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Smith the
Mississippi Supreme Court held that “plaintiffs seeking
to have oil producers clean up byproduct pollution must
seek restoration from the Mississippi Oil and Gas Board
before a court can assess the appropriate measure of
damages.”4 The Town and landowners argued that
Chevron did not apply, since they specifically sought
money damages and did not seek to have the defendants
remediate the contaminated property.
The court found that the types of materials alleged
to have contaminated the leased property were encompassed by the definition of “oil field exploration and
production waste” as defined by Mississippi law.5 Under
state law the Board has exclusive jurisdiction to “regulate
the use, manufacture, production, ownership, investigation and noncommercial disposal of oil field exploration
and production waste.”6 Thus, in the view of the court,
the Board clearly possessed jurisdiction. The court then
took notice that the Board’s authority extended to making reasonable rules, regulations, standards and orders,
and issuing permits; assessing penalties for violations of
applicable statutes and Board regulations, and for willful
concealment of information or for the making of false
reports to the Board; enforcing any penalties it assesses,
and suing to obtain injunctions for the purpose of
restraining violations or threatened violations.7 In addition, any citizen of the state may notify the Board of an
actual or threatened violation and if the Board fails to
take action on this notice within ten days the party serving notice may bring suit for an injunction so long as the
Board is named as a party to that suit.8
Therefore, to the extent that the harm suffered by
the appellants involved the alleged contamination of
their property, the court found that the Board did
indeed have the exclusive authority to require the
responsible parties to clean up the contamination. The
court stated that “[i]t would contravene the public interest . . . to allow the landowners to pursue a monetary
award without requiring them to first present their allegations to the Oil and Gas Board to secure decontamination of the property.”9 However, the court did not
ignore the fact that the cleanup of the property, while
the overarching public policy concern in this case, was
not the primary remedy sought by the Town and
landowners. They also sought money damages, including punitive damages, against the defendants for their
alleged tortious and/or illegal actions. The court agreed
that McMullan and McRaney should be granted a stay
on their common law causes of action in order to preserve those causes against the running of the statute of
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limitations. Since statutes of limitations do not run
against subdivisions of the state in civil cases, the common law claims of the Town of Bolton did not need to
be stayed.
Conclusion
The appeals court upheld the lower court’s ruling that
the Town and landowners’ action was subject to the
requirement of exhaustion with regard to administrative
remedies, but reversed the dismissal of McMullan’s and
McRaney’s common law causes of action and remanded
to the circuit court to stay those actions pending the
plaintiffs’ exhaustion of administrative remedies.
ENDNOTES
1. State v. Bebe, 687 So.2d 702, 704 (Miss. 1996).
2. Campbell Sixty-Six Express, Inc. v. J. & G. Express, Inc.,
141 So.2d 720, 726 (Miss. 1962).
3. Pub. Employees’ Retirement Sys. v. Hawkins, 781 So.2d
899, 906 (Miss. 2001).
4. 844 So.2d 1145 (Miss. 2002).
5. Miss. Code § 53-1-3(t).
6. Id. § 53-1-17(7) (emphasis added).
7. Town of Bolton v. Chevron Oil Co., No. 2004-CA00865-COA at ¶ 18 (Miss. App. Aug 2, 2005).
8. Id.
9. Id. at ¶ 28.
Stock photograph courtesy of the ©Nova Development Corp.
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Alabama Appeals Court Upholds
Antidegradation Policy
Alabama Dept. of Envtl. Mgt. v. Legal Envtl. Assistance
Found., Inc., Nos. 2030878 and 2040311, 2005 WL
1925756 (Ala. Civ. App. Aug. 12, 2005)
Alina Johns, 3L, Stetson University College of Law
Background
The Federal Antidegradation Policy,1 authorized by the
Clean Water Act, requires each state to adopt a policy
for dealing with antidegradation and a process for
implementing that policy. This state antidegradation
policy should define the limits for dumping pollutants
into the state’s waterways. Alabama, through the Alabama Department of Environmental Management
(ADEM) and the Alabama Environmental Management Commission (the Commission) developed such a
policy2 but failed to include a process for implementing it.
Upon discovering this discrepancy, the Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation (LEAF) made a complaint to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA). The EPA responded through its Regional
Administrator for Region IV, in Atlanta, by letter to
ADEM. The letter stated that Alabama’s policy was
lacking procedures for implementation and that the
state should take measures to amend the policy. If new
procedures were not submitted within ninety days the
Regional Administrator would recommend that the
EPA Administrator in Washington “prepare and publish proposed federal regulations setting forth a revised
statewide antidegradation policy.”3
ADEM responded by implementing procedures4
which allowed the maximum amount of pollutants permissible under the federal regulations. The EPA
Administrator approved these procedures on August
25, 1999. LEAF sued, and ultimately the Alabama
Supreme Court found the procedures to be invalid
because they violated the Alabama Administrative
Procedure Act and the Alabama Environmental
Management Act.5
On June 26, 2002, the Commission adopted a new
policy6 which implemented procedures in much the
same way that the previous illegal procedures had done.
LEAF responded again with legal action. LEAF moved
for summary judgment, which the trial court granted in

part. The court then granted partial summary judgment as to the rest of the counts in LEAF’s complaint
in favor of ADEM on May 24, 2004. On June 9, 2004,
the trial court vacated its previous rulings and granted
summary judgment on all counts in favor of LEAF. The
Commission and ADEM appealed the final judgment,
but the appellate court found that since the trial court
entered its final judgment within thirty days that it was
legally proper.
ADEM and the Commission appealed on all rulings. The appellate court reversed on every count.
Notice
LEAF asserted a challenge based on a section of the
Alabama Code which states that “[u]nless different
notice provisions are specifically required elsewhere by
law” ADEM is to provide 45 days’ public notice of an
impending public hearing of the Commission on the
proposed adoption, amendment, or repeal of a state
environmental rule and simultaneously is to “make
available ... summaries of the reasons supporting [the]
adoption, amendment, or repeal.”7 ADEM had issued
a “summary of reasons” which it believed fulfilled this
requirement. LEAF argued that this set of explanations did not justify some of the provisions that later
followed. The trial court agreed, but the appellate
court reversed stating that, in its estimation, LEAF
could have responded by opposing the reasons given,
despite the fact that some of the provisions which later
followed did not fall under the reasons.
Adoption of Matter by Reference
LEAF’s next contention regarded the adoption of matter by reference in violation of other statutes. Their
argument had three components: “(1) that the rule’s
reference to the list adopts matter by reference in contravention of Ala.Code 1975, § 41-22-9; (2) that the
reference to the list adopts future matter by reference in
violation of Ala.Code 1975, §§ 22-22A-8 and 41-22-5;
and (3) that the reference to the list improperly delegates environmental rulemaking authority to the
EPA.”8 The code that provided them with these arguments reads as follows: “[a]n agency may adopt, by reference in its rules and without publishing the adopted
matter in full, all or any part of a code, standard or reg-
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ulation which has been adopted by any
other agency of this state or any
agency of the United States or by
a generally recognized organization or association approved by
the joint committee administrative regulation review. The
reference shall fully identify
the adopted matter by date
and otherwise. The agency
shall have available copies of
the adopted matter for
inspection and the rules
shall state where copies of
the adopted matter can be
obtained and any charge
therefore as of the time the
rule is adopted.”9
As to LEAF’s first contention, the court found
that merely referring to
another document does
not constitute adoption of
that document by reference. As to LEAF’s second
contention, the court held
that for the sake of efficiency it believed that the way
the rule was set up was adequate. Lastly, the court held that
since ADEM was required to draft these rules
based on federal law and subject to federal approval it
did not violate the Alabama statute.
110% Rule
Under the federal policy, state antidegradation policies
must require those who wish to pollute the waterways
to show that there are not viable alternatives. ADEM’s
revised policy states that if an alternative costs 110% of
the method being requested or more, then it would not
be deemed a viable alternative. The appellate court
again reversed in favor of ADEM, making reference to
a 1997 letter from the agency’s attorney that referred to
a manual from the EPA which stated that 110% was an
acceptable measure.
Void for Vagueness
The last argument LEAF asserted was that the policy is
void for vagueness under the Due Process clause of the
Alabama Constitution.10 The phrase at issue reads as
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follows: “[a]pplicants for [new or expanded
discharges to Tier 2 waters] are
required to demonstrate that
the proposed discharge is necessary for important economic or social development as a part of the permit application process.”11
This phrase was meant to
summarize an EPA regulation12 which is eleven
lines long. The appellate
court, noting that the
EPA regulation has
been criticized for
being vague as well,
found that the Alabama policy’s vagueness did not rise to an
unconstitutional
level.
Conclusion
The appellate court
reversed the trial
cour t in favor of
ADEM and the Commission on all
counts. The court held that the antidegradation policy survived every challenge.

ENDNOTES
1. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12.
2. Ala. Admin. Code r. 335-6-10-.04.
3. Alabama Dept. of Envtl. Mgt. v. Legal Envtl.
Assistance Found., Inc., Nos. 2030878 and
2040311, 2005 WL 1925756 at *1 (Ala. Civ. App.
Aug. 12, 2005) (“ADEM v. LEAF”).
4. Ala. Admin. Code r. 335-6-10-.04(03).
5. Ex parte Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc., 832
So.2d 5. (Ala. 2002).
6. Ala. Admin. Code r. 335-6-10-.12.
7. Ala. Code § 22-22A-8(a).
8. ADEM v. LEAF at *7.
9. Ala. Code § 41-22-9.
10. Ala. Const. art. I, § 6.
11. ADEM v. LEAF at *11 (quoting Ala. Admin. Code
r. 335-6-10-.12).
12. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(2).
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Florida Court Upholds Dock Permit Denial
Manatees Protected from Recreational Hazards on Inland Waters

Florida Marine Contractors, et al. v. Williams, 378
F.Supp.2d 1353 (M.D. Fla. 2005)
Emily Plett-Miyake, 3L, Vermont Law School
On July 13, 2005, the U.S. District Court in Tampa,
Florida held that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service was
correct in denying an application to construct recreational docks and similar structures on Florida’s inland
waterways after determining that such action was likely
to have more than a “negligible impact” on the West
Indian manatee, commonly known as the Florida manatee.
Background
Plaintiffs, who are landowners, marine contractors,
and a marine contractors’ industry association, sought
Clean Water Act § 404 permits from the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers to construct docks and other similar structures on Florida’s inland waterways. The
docks were to be used for recreational purposes,
including the operation and docking of recreational
motorboats. The waterways in question are inhabited
by Florida manatees.
The Corps determined that the issuance of the permit might threaten the Florida manatee, a listed species
under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). This finding
triggered an ESA § 7 consultation with the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service (Service), through which the
Service found that the construction and use of the
docks would result in “incidental taking” of manatees
under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA).1
Due to an absence of necessary precautions2 the Service
found that the proposed project would have more than
a negligible impact on the species. Based on these findings, the Service concluded that the permit application
should be denied.
The plaintiffs challenged the denial under the
Administrative Procedure Act,3 arguing that the MMPA
“does not apply to residential docks built on Florida’s
inland waters, and, therefore, the Service unlawfully
applied the Act’s provisions to deny their permit applications.”4 The issues before the court were: (1) whether
the MMPA provisions establishing a moratorium on
taking and importation of marine mammals and generally banning taking permits for marine mammals cor-

rectly govern the Service’s consideration of permit
applications, and (2) whether the MMPA applies to
Florida’s inland waters without limitations for hazard
attributable to recreational activities. The court held in
the affirmative for both issues.
The Marine Mammal Protection Act
The MMPA was passed by Congress in 1972 “to protect marine mammal species and population stocks that
are or may be ‘in danger of extinction or depletion as a
result of man’s activities.’”5 Stating its aim as preventing
marine mammals “from diminish[ing] beyond the
point at which they cease to be a significant functioning element in the ecosystem of which they are a part,
and…below their optimum sustainable population,”6
Congress specifically recognized the importance of varied habitats: “[e]fforts should be made to protect essential habitats, including the rookeries, mating grounds,
and areas of similar significance for each species…from
the adverse effect of man’s actions.”7
Congress imposed a moratorium on the taking and
importation of marine mammals, banning the issuance
of all take permits in § 1371. While there are a number
of exceptions, all are very limited and are to be narrowly applied. Section 1372(a)(2) makes it unlawful for
“any person or vessel or other conveyance to take any
marine mammal in waters or on lands under the jurisdiction of the United States.” Various other provisions
grant exclusive jurisdiction over marine mammal conservation and management to the federal government,
preempting state authority.
The Court’s Reasoning
Neither party to the case disputed the factual finding
that the proposed project was likely to harm and result
in the incidental take of manatees at levels exceeding
nominal harm. Rather, they disagreed over whether the
MMPA could properly be used to deny the permit,
based on possible jurisdictional limitations in the
statute. The question was whether an exception in the
MMPA that allows incidental takings having only a
“negligible impact” on a marine mammal species8
applied to the plaintiffs’ proposed activities.
The plaintiffs did not make the argument that the
exception applied to them. Rather, they argued that
the MMPA does not apply to takings that occur in a
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state’s inland waters when such takings are caused by
recreational activities. The issue that the court
addressed then became “whether section 1371 applies
to a state’s inland waters without limitations for hazards attributable to recreational activities.”9 Here, the
court found that Congress did address the precise
question before them.
The court referred to language in the statute that
recognized the importance of the entire ecosystems of
which marine mammals are a part, the unambiguous
intent of the MMPA to protect those marine mammals
and stop their depletion, the usurpation of state
authority over the species by federal management, and
numerous findings from legislative history to support
the finding that “Congress clearly expected the protections of the Act to apply to all areas within the states,
including internal waters.”10 The court also commented that the plaintiffs’ suggestion that the MMPA does
not apply to inland waters weakens the protections
afforded to marine mammals by nullifying state laws
and failing to replace them with federal laws. This
interpretation, the court opined, would clearly lead to
an absurd result.
After determining that the clear objective of the
MMPA is to protect marine mammals from man-made
dangers in all of their natural habitat, including inland
waters, the court turned to § 1371. “The moratorium
on takings and permits in section 1371 undoubtedly
was designed to further the objectives set
forth in section 1361…Congress clearly
designed section 1371 to end the taking of
marine mammals without regard to the
nature of the activity that caused the taking
or the precise location within the habitat
where the taking has occurred.”11 The
court found that the exception did not
apply here because it had been factually
determined that the project would result
in a more than negligible impact, and
because “applying the moratorium provisions of section 1371 to a state’s inland
waters would not constitute an expansion
of the geographic scope of the Act.”12 In
fact, “[t]o hold that section 1371 does not
extend to certain areas inhabited by marine
mammals would divorce this section from
the Act’s objective by permitting ‘man’s
activities’ of a recreational nature to continue unabated in areas making up marine
mammal habitats.”13
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Conclusion
Finding that the Service’s construction and application
was in accordance with the clear intent of Congress as
expressed in provisions of the MMPA, the court upheld
the Service’s decision to deny the plaintiffs’ permit.

ENDNOTES
1. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421h. The MMPA defines
“take” as “to harass, hunt, capture, or kill, or attempt
to harass, hunt, capture or kill any marine mammal.” 16 U.S.C. § 1362(13). Takings that are incidental to otherwise lawful activities are permitted
under certain conditions. 50 C.F.R. § 18.27.
2. For example, speed zones, sign postings, and
enforcement that would protect the manatees in
the area from harm.
3. 5 U.S.C. § 706.
4. 378 F.Supp.2d at 1356.
5. 16 U.S.C. § 1361(1).
6. Id. § 1361(2).
7. Id.
8. Id. § 1371(a)(5)(A).
9. 378 F.Supp.2d at 1360.
10. Id. at 1361.
11. Id. at 1362.
12. Id. at 1364.
13. Id.

Sketch of manatee courtesy of NOAA’s Historic NMFS Collection
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Final Action, from page 1

Both parties moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted summary judgment to the
Corps, finding that the issuance of new NWPs did not
constitute a final agency action because the appellants
still have an opportunity to apply for individual permits and are “not legally denied anything until [their]
individual permit[s] are rejected.”4 The appellants
appealed the district court’s ruling.
Final Agency Action & the APA
The appeals court first addressed whether the Corps’
issuance of the NWPs was a final agency action subject
to challenge under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) and whether such challenge was ripe for review.
The APA empowers a federal court to review a “final

The court found that
the NWPs directly
affect investment
and project
development choices.
agency action”; an agency action is reviewable if it is
definitive and has a direct and immediate effect on the
day-to-day business of the party challenging it.5 The
court found that both conditions were satisfied in the
issuance of the NWPs. The action was definitive
because the NWPs are not tentative or interlocutory any party may discharge fill and dredged materials into
navigable waters if they meet the required conditions;
no other procedure is required. Even though the appellants could apply for individual permits, additional
administrative proceedings are “different in kind and
legal effect from the burdens attending what heretofore
has been considered to be final agency action.”6 The
court also held that the NWPs had a direct and immediate effect on the appellants because they create legal
rights and impose binding obligations by authorizing
certain discharges of dredged and fill materials without

any further project specific review. Parties that do not
meet the NWPs’ requirements have only two options:
apply for individual permits or modify their projects.
Either way, the NWPs directly affect the investment
and project development choices.
Next, the court turned to the issue of ripeness to
consider whether the issues were ready for judicial
review and the hardship to the parties of withholding
court consideration.7 The court found the issues ripe
because the appellants alleged the Corps exceeded its
statutory authority in drafting NWPs and its action
was arbitrary and capricious. Even though the appellants could still apply for an independent permit, no
further factual development would be necessary to
evaluate the appellants’ challenges. The court also
found that by postponing the review of the
appellants’ claims, they were left with only
the two aforementioned options: to modify
the projects or wait and try to get an individual permit. Either way, the court found
that a considerable hardship existed and that
judicial review was appropriate.
Review under the RFA
The court then addressed whether the appellants could challenge the Corps’ compliance
with the RFA. A challenge under the RFA
requires that the challenged rule be subject
to the RFA.8 The Corps argued that the
NWPs are not “rules” and therefore are not
subject to judicial review under the RFA.
But the court found that the NWPs fit within the statutory definition of rules because
they are “legal prescription[s] of general and prospective applicability which the Corps has issued to implement the permitting authority the Congress entrusted
to it in section 404 of the CWA.”9
The Corps also argued that NWPs are not rules
because the agency did not issue a notice of rulemaking. However, because NWPs “grant rights, impose
obligations, and produce significant effects on private
interests” the court considered them rules.10
Environmental Assessment under NEPA
Finally the court addressed the issue of whether or not
the appellants had standing to challenge the Corps’
compliance with NEPA. The appellants claimed that
the Corps violated NEPA by failing to prepare a
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
(PEIS) for the NWPs.
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A question of standing
involves both constitutional limitations on federal
court jurisdiction and prudential limits on its exercise. 1 1 Here, the cour t
found that it was fairly selfevident that constitutional
standing (which requires
injury in fact, causation,
and redressability) was adequate; however, with respect to prudential standing the issue remained
whether the appellants’
grievance fell within the
zone of interests protected
by NEPA.
The Nationwide Public
Projects Coalition (NPPC),
the only appellant claiming
that the Corps violated
NEPA, asserted that the
Corps’ failure to issue more
lenient NWPs prevented its
members from improving
the environment. The
court held that the NPPC
failed to demonstrate by a
“substantial probability”
that it had any qualifying
interest. The court found
the NPPC’s proposed harm
to be too speculative because it never mentioned a specific project that will not be undertaken because of the
more restrictive NWPs.
Conclusion
With its ruling, the D.C. Circuit has required the federal district courts to hear claims that have been
brought by plaintiffs who have been significantly
affected by limitations set forth in general permits. It is
no longer necessary to try to apply for an independent
permit when a general permit has already restricted
one’s interests.
ENDNOTES
1. Appellants include the National Association of
Home Builders, the National Stone, Sand and
Gravel Association, the American Road and
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Blueprint graphic courtesy of ©Nova Development Corp.
Logo courtesy of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Transportation Builders Association, the
Nationwide Public Projects Coalition, the
National Federation of Independent Businesses,
and Wayne Newnam, an Ohio homebuilder.
2. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
3. Natl. Assn. of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 417 F.3d 1272, 1275 (D.C. Cir
2005)(“NAHB”).
4. Natl. Assn. of Homebuilders v. Army Corps of
Engineers, 297 F.Supp.2d 74, 80 (D.D.C. 2003).
5. FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232 (1980).
6. Id. at 242.
7. Abbott Labs v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967).
8. See 5 U.S.C. § 611(a)(1).
9. NAHB, 417 F.3d at 1284.
10. Id. at 1285.
11. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997).
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Court Defers to Corps’ Findings in
Terminal Project
Shoreacres v. Waterworth, 420 F.3d 440 (5th Cir.
2005)
Benjamin N. Spruill, 3L, Roger Williams University
School of Law
Opponents of the Bayport terminal project for
Galveston Bay challenged the Army Corps of
Engineers’ issuance of a dredge and fill permit, arguing
that the Corps violated the federal Clean Water Act and
the National Environmental Policy Act. The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals deferred to findings of the
Corps and approved the dredge and fill permits, allowing development plans to proceed.
Background
In 1998, the Port of Houston (Port) sought to construct the Bayport terminal at an undeveloped portion
of land on the northwest coast of Galveston Bay, Texas.
The terminal design called for seven cargo ship berths,
three cruise ship berths, and the necessary infrastructure and facilities. As required by the Clean Water Act
(CWA), the Port applied for a dredge and fill application with the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps). After
the procedural requirements of public notice and comment, publication of several environmental impact
statements (EISs), and publication of a Record of
Decision, the Corps granted the permit to the Port on
January 5, 2004.
The City of Shoreacres and several other environmental and professional interest groups challenged the
validity of the Corps’ issuance of the dredge and fill
permit. Shoreacres sought rescission of the permit
under both the CWA and the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA). Having been denied a remedy in
district court, Shoreacres appealed to the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals.
Court Deference to Agency Action
A federal court’s ability to review and overturn a federal agency’s decision is described by the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA). Specifically, the Fifth Circuit
could set aside the Corps’ decision if it was “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in

accordance with the law.”1 Critical to rescission of the
permit was whether the Corps acted in a manner outlined in the APA; if the agency acted within the scope
of the statute, the court would give substantial deference to the Corps’ decision.
Wetlands Jurisdiction
Shoreacres first challenged the Corps’ dredge and fill
permit by arguing that the Corps inaccurately assessed
the amount of wetlands at the site that is regulated by
the CWA. Potentially, 146 acres of wetlands at the
Bayport terminal site fell under the wetlands jurisdiction
of the CWA. The Corps had authority to regulate these
waters, including the Bayport terminal site; however, the
Corps estimated that only 19.7 of those acres fell within its regulatory jurisdiction. Shoreacres argued that the
19.7 acres was a gross underestimation of the wetland
acreage within the Corps’ regulatory control, inferring
that if more wetlands were within the jurisdiction of the
CWA, a dredge and fill permit would not be issued.
Because other methodologies determined wetland jurisdiction encompassed the entire 146 acres, Shoreacres
argued that the Corps’ method was an abuse of discretion. The court, however, found the Corps’ failure to use
other methods to determine wetland jurisdiction irrelevant to an abuse of discretion analysis. The Port offered
extensive mitigation for environmental damages resulting from the Bayport terminal construction. The court
agreed with the Corps that the mitigation package justified issuance of the dredge and fill permit, even if all 146
acres were regulated by the CWA.
Shoreacres also argued that the court should not
defer to the Corps’ decision because the wetlands jurisdiction analysis was an error of law, not fact. When an
agency commits an error of law, a court can analyze the
decision, giving no deference to the earlier decision.
Here, the court found that wetlands jurisdiction was an
issue of fact, based on scientific data to be analyzed by
the agency. Because the Corps properly decided a factual issue, the court deferred to the Corps’ findings.
Practicable Alternatives
Shoreacres next argued that a dredge and fill permit
cannot be issued if there is a “practicable alternative”
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to the proposed discharge and that the
Corps abused its discretion because it did
not consider any alternative sites, specifically Shoal Point and Pelican Island.2 A
practicable alternative, defined as one that
“is available and capable of being done
after taking into consideration cost, existing technology, and logistics in light of
overall project purposes,” was not accessible to the Port.3 The court dismissed both
sites as practicable alternatives because
they were located outside Harris County.
The Port intended to fund the Bayport
terminal construction cost from the proceeds of a bond issue and restrictions on
the bond prevented any spending outside
Harris County. Although alternative
funding was possible, the court ruled that
“a mere, unsupported theoretical possibility of acquiring the alternative site… does not constitute a showing that the alternative site is reasonably
obtainable” and again deferred to the Corps’ decision.4
The “No-Action” Alternative
Shoreacres claimed that the Corps failed to meet the
procedural requirements of NEPA in three instances.
First, NEPA requires that the Corps consider alternatives for construction of the Bayport terminal, including other development sites, and the alternative of no
project. As part of its final EIS, the Corps did not consider the existence of a similar project located on the
southwest coast of Galveston Bay at Shoal Point.
Shoreacres argued that the Corps’ failure to consider
the Texas City project in the no-action alternative
analysis was arbitrary and capricious because Shoal
Point was an existing condition that was relevant to the
issuance of the Bayport dredge and fill permit. The
Shoal Point project, however, was still in planning
stages and development was not guaranteed. Instead of
viewing it as an existing condition, the Corps viewed
the Shoal Point project as merely a possibility when
analyzing the no-action alternative. The court did not
find this treatment of the Shoal Point project as either
arbitrary or capricious and deferred to the findings of
the Corps.
Channel Dredging
Shoreacres claimed under both the CWA and NEPA
that the Corps acted arbitrarily by failing to consider
that the Houston Ship Channel would be deepened to
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Aerial view of Galveston Bay courtesy of NASA

accommodate larger vessels traveling to the Bayport
terminal. Shoreacres argued that deepening of the
Houston Ship Channel would alter the Galveston Bay
ecosystem by changing salinity levels. NEPA required
the Corps to consider indirect adverse environmental
effects of issuing a dredge and fill permit. Indirect
effects are “caused by the action and are later in time or
farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably
foreseeable.”5 Scant evidence, however, showed that the
channel would require deepening, as present and
future vessel traffic could traverse the channel at the
current depth. Additionally, the Corps’ issuance of the
dredge and fill permit could never cause the channel to
be dredged; as the court reasoned, only an act of
Congress can effectuate channel deepening.
NEPA – The Split Alternative
Finally, the Corps rejected a proposal to split the
Bayport project, building some cargo berths at Bayport
and others at Shoal Point, because it was environmentally unacceptable. Because the Corps issued a separate
dredge and fill permit for a six-berth terminal at Shoal
Point to Texas City, in addition to the Bayport project,
Shoreacres contended that existence of both ports is
environmentally unacceptable as well. However, the
court found that under NEPA the Corps could separately approve two different permits.
Conclusion
As required by the APA, the court was highly deferential to the findings of the Corps. Holding that the
See Galveston Bay, page 14
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Fifth Circuit Finds Contract Has
“Salty Flavor”
Hoda v. Rowan Cos., Inc., 419 F.3d 379 (5th Cir.
2005)
Josh Clemons
In July the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
addressed an age-old question that has vexed legal
scholars since Hammurabi: does torquing bolts on a
blow-out preventer from a jack-up drilling rig used as a
work platform constitute a maritime contract?
Facts
Defendant Rowan Drilling Co., Inc. owns the Gorilla II,
a jack-up drilling rig operating on the Outer
Continental Shelf for oil production company
Westport. A jack-up drilling rig is “a drilling rig used in
offshore drilling whose drilling platform is a barge from
which legs are lowered to the bottom when over the drill
site and which is raised above the water and supported
on the legs to conduct drilling operations.”1 For legal
purposes a jack-up drilling rig is considered a vessel.
The Gorilla II serviced a Westport wellhead off the
Louisiana coast that had no fixed platform. Westport
contracted with Greene’s Pressure Testing and Rentals
to provide labor on the rig under individual work
orders. Under the contract, called the “Master Service
Agreement,” Greene’s responsibilities included
“hydrostatic testing, hydraulic torque wrench service, nut splitters, casing cutting, pipeline/production
and miscellaneous rental tool equipment.”2
Greene’s was enlisted to help with the installation
and changing of blow-out preventers on the wellhead,
which involved the torquing up and torquing down
(tightening and loosening) of bolts on the preventers.
Rowan personnel used the Gorilla II’s crane and other
equipment to place and align the blow-out preventers, and place the nuts and bolts on them for
torquing (or perform the same activities in reverse for
removal of preventers).
The torquing was performed by Greene’s personnel, among them plaintiff Billy Hoda. Hoda tripped
over hoses on the rig’s deck while torquing bolts.
According to Hoda, the fall caused “severe injuries to
his body and mind, including but not limited to, low

back and other serious and permanently disabling
injuries to the body and mind that will prevent him
from performing his regular job on information and
belief, and occupation requiring manual labor.”3
Lawsuit
Hoda sued Rowan on the grounds that the company
was negligent in keeping the work area cluttered and
unstable. Rowan in turn sued Greene’s and Atlantic
Insurance Company (Atlantic) for indemnification
against Hoda’s claim. This third-party complaint was
based on an indemnity provision in the Master Service
Agreement. Hoda settled his claim with Rowan, but the
dispute over indemnification between Rowan and the
other parties remained alive. This was the dispute at
issue in this case.
Legal Issues
The controversy before the court was the enforceability
of the Master Service Agreement’s indemnity provision.
Rowan wanted the provision enforced so that it could
Photograph of man working on crane courtesy of ©Nova Development Corp.
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be reimbursed by Greene’s and Atlantic for the money
it paid to Hoda. Greene’s and Atlantic, for obvious reasons, did not want the provision enforced.
In Louisiana, the enforceability of indemnity provisions is governed in part by the Louisiana Oilfield AntiIndemnity Act.4 The Act invalidates such indemnity
provisions if the contract is non-maritime. The precise
issue the court had to decide, then, was whether the
Master Service Agreement was a maritime contract.
The Court’s Analysis
The court looked to its decision in the 1990 case of
Davis & Sons, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp.5 for guidance on
determining whether a contract is maritime. Davis
lays out a two-pronged approach. The court should
examine the “historical treatment in the jurisprudence,” and also apply a “six-factor fact specific
inquiry.”6 The factors are: “(1) what does the specific
work order in effect at the time of injury provide? (2)
what work did the crew assigned under the work order
actually do? (3) was the crew assigned to work aboard
a vessel in navigable waters? (4) to what extent did the
work being done relate to the mission of that vessel?
(5) what was the principal work of the injured worker? and (6) what work was the injured worker actually
doing at the time of injury?”7 The court also observed
that the maritime or non-maritime nature of a contract is a function of its “nature and character, not…its
place of execution or performance.”8
Although the court had never before considered the
question of whether a contract for the type of bolttorquing in which Hoda was engaged was maritime, it
did find some guidance in its examination of the “historical treatment in the jurisprudence.” At first, the history seemed to favor Greene’s and Atlantic: oil and gas
production is not generally considered a traditional
maritime activity, and the fact that work is done on a
jack-up drilling rig is not, by itself, enough to render
that activity maritime. In a previous case the court had
held that work being done on a jack-up rig under a contract to gather geophysical data was not maritime just
because the rig, which functioned as a work platform,
was a vessel.9
However, in that case the court also opined that “a
specialty services contract related to oil and gas exploration and drilling takes on a salty flavor when its performance is more than incidentally related to the execution of the vehicle’s mission.”10 Rowan argued that
the contract in this case was like that in two other cases
in which contracts to provide casing services on jack-
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up rigs were held to be maritime because the contract
work was “inextricably intertwined with the maritime
activities of the rig and its crew.”11 Dismissing Greene’s
counterarguments, the court declared that “Greene’s
services were ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the activity on the rig, were dependent on Rowan’s placement of
the equipment on which Greene’s employees worked,
and could not be performed without the rig’s direct
involvement.”12 This analysis indicated that the contract was maritime.
The court’s examination of the Davis factors further
established the contract’s “salty flavor.” The court did
not provide detail of its analysis other than to note that
the only factor that might possibly conflict with its
determination was the fourth: that the work being done
relate to the mission of the vessel. Otherwise, the factors showed that there was a “functional interrelationship of Greene’s work with the rig” adequate to render
the contract maritime.13 The court was careful to note
that this decision was based on the specific facts and
does not mean that “oil and gas services contracts are
maritime whenever they contribute to the mission of
the jack-up drilling rig.”14
Conclusion
The appeals court upheld the trial court’s decision that
this contract is maritime, and that the indemnity provision is therefore enforceable. Greene’s and Atlantic
must indemnify Rowan for the injuries Billy Hoda sustained while working aboard the jack-up drilling rig.

ENDNOTES
1. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary
<http://www.m-w.com/>.
2. Hoda v. Rowan Cos., Inc., 419 F.3d 379, 381 (5th
Cir. 2005).
3. Pl.’s Compl. for Damages ¶ 8 (Sept. 6, 2002).
4. La. Stat. Ann. § 9:2780.
5. 919 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1990).
6. Hoda at 381.
7. Id. (quoting Davis, 919 F.2d at 316).
8. Id. (emphasis in original; internal quotes omitted).
9. Dominique v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co.,
923 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1991).
10. Hoda at 382 (paraphrasing Dominique).
11. Id. (internal quotes omitted).
12. Id. at 383.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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Galveston Bay, from page 11

Corps did not act in a capricious or arbitrary way nor
abused its discretion, the court upheld the issuance of
the dredge and fill permit for the Bayport terminal.
ENDNOTES
1. 5 U.S.C. § 706.
2. Shoreacres v. Waterworth, 420 F.3d 440, 447-48 (5th
Cir. 2005).
3. Id. at 448.
4. Id. at 449.
5. Id. at 452.
Photograph of dredge bucket courtesy of NOAA

Your Generosity Poured in to Katrina Kids!
Waurene Roberson
People from the Sea Grant College Program and NOAA
are some of the most caring and generous people in the
world, as the picture below clearly shows. You are all
awesome, look what you have done!
In the wake of the disaster left by Hurricane Katrina,
the country was worried and perplexed, unsure of what
they could do to help. We at the Mississippi-Alabama
Sea Grant Legal Program and the Sea Grant Law Center
were no different. Only seven hours north of the devastated area, with all roads south closed, and communications down, we felt as helpless as anyone across the country. The giant relief programs were turning down donations and volunteer time in favor of dollars and checks,
but that didn’t satisfy the need to do something.
During the course of some brainstorming on this
problem, we thought of all the beautiful conference bags,
pens and pencils out there - collecting dust in closets, or
still in their boxes, left over from one conference or
another. An “aha!” moment occurred and we sent out

emails on the listservs, asking for those and other school
supplies for the children who had lost everything,
whether still in the devastated area or evacuees.
We knew that everyone would want to help, but the
response was astounding in scope and hugely affirming!
Boxes began to arrive daily (two whole pallets of supplies
arrived one day) and our office became infamous among
delivery services and post office personnel. The vacant
office we used to store these items as we assembled filled
bookbags began to overflow with your generosity and the
generosity of all the friends you recruited to the cause!
We never dreamed that y’all would send such an abundance: 627 filled backpacks, an additional 200 unfilled
book bags, ten boxes of assorted teacher's supplies, six
boxes of new (spiffy) t-shirts, two big boxes of toys, children's books and many boxes of other assorted items!
There are a few more pictures and a distribution
map on the the website for your enjoyment:
http://www.olemiss.edu/orgs/SGLC/KatrinaKids/pictures.htm
http://www.olemiss.edu/orgs/SGLC/KatrinaKids/angels.htm
http://www.olemiss.edu/orgs/SGLC/KatrinaKids/map.htm
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(a little something extra)

Around the Gulf...
Hurricane Katrina spawned many unforgettable images of destruction. Among those, perhaps none captured the
immense power of a storm surge better than the pictures of Mississippi’s massive floating casino barges lying askew
on the north side of U.S. Highway 90, hundreds of feet from their berths, after the waters subsided. The casinos’
vital economic importance to the state spurred the legislature to quickly pass a bill allowing land-based casinos for
the first time. The governor signed the bill into law on October 17. For political reasons, since they were first authorized in 1990 Mississippi’s non-tribal casinos have been relegated to the navigable waters of the Mississippi River, its
tributaries, and the Gulf of Mexico. They may now be built on land 800 feet from their former locations. Before
Katrina, Mississippi’s casino gambling industry employed almost 18,000 people and generated annual revenues of
$740 million for the state. The new legislation will encourage rapid rebuilding; several hard-hit casinos plan to be
operating by very early next year, and the Imperial Palace, which was the least damaged, anticipates reopening by
Christmas.
The Mississippi Department of Marine Resources (DMR) has stepped in to pay oyster fishers to help with debris
removal in the aftermath of Katrina. DMR’s program is intended both to help oyster fishers who have lost at least
an entire season of oystering and to clean up and rehabilitate the state’s oyster reefs. The storm surge from Katrina
devastated the reefs by scouring them out and dropping debris, which was picked up as buildings were destroyed on
land. The program was opened to oyster fishers who have held an oyster license within the last two years. Funds will
come from money DMR received after last year’s Hurricane Ivan.
Shrimpers also enjoyed some temporary relief from the government in the wake of Katrina. On September 22
NOAA Fisheries (formerly the National Marine Fisheries Service, or NMFS) authorized shrimp trawlers in Alabama,
Mississippi, and Louisiana to ply their trade without using turtle excluder devices, or TEDs. Debris from the storm
was clogging the devices, not only rendering them virtually useless for saving turtles, but also severely limiting the
amount of shrimp that could be caught. During the temporary authorization the shrimpers must limit their tow
times (the time the trawl doors enter the water until they are removed from the water) to fifty-five minutes or less.
The authorization was set to expire on October 22; however, after Hurricane Rita struck, NMFS extended it until
November 23 and expanded its range to include some Texas waters. TEDs protect endangered sea turtles, including
the very endangered Kemp’s Ridley, from being caught in the nets.
In addition, after Katrina and Rita NMFS put into effect emergency consultation procedures under the Endangered
Species Act (ESA) and the Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA). The ESA requires federal agencies to consult with NMFS
when their activities may affect ESA-listed species and/or critical habitat. Similarly, the MSA requires consultation
when federal agency activities may adversely affect essential fish habitat. NMFS regulations allow for expedited consultation procedures in case of emergency; here, the procedures were implemented for activities associated with the
protection of human life and property, protection of the environment, and for projects whose rapid completion is
required for the recovery of the areas affected by the storms. Such activities may include road and bridge building,
channel dredging, and cleanup of debris and hazardous materials.
As this issue is going to press, the U.S. District Court in Tampa has issued an opinion overturning a ban on grouper
fishing in the Gulf of Mexico. NMFS had restricted fishing of all grouper species in order to protect one species,
red grouper. The agency was sued by two recreational fishing groups, the Coastal Conservation Association and the
Fishing Rights Alliance. The court invalidated portions of the rule, although some restrictions remain. Water Log
will cover the case, Coastal Conservation Assn. v. Gutierrez, in more detail in our next issue.
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Upcoming Conferences • • •
•DECEMBER 2005 •

Water and Civilization: 4th International Water Conference
December 1, 2005, Paris, France
http://www.iwha.net
Southeast Regional Technical Seminar on
Hydraulic Analysis for Spillways
December 6, 2005, Charlotte, NC
http://www.damsafety.org

•FEBRUARY 2006 •
Aquaculture America 2006
February 13-16, 2006, Las Vegas, Nevada
http://www.was.org

•MARCH 2006 •
16th Annual AEHS Meeting & West Coast Conference on Soils,
Sediments, & Water
March 13-16, 2005, San Diego, CA
http://www.aehs.com/conferences
Fourth World Water Forum
March 16-22, 2006, Mexico City, Mexico
http://worldwaterforum4.org.mx

